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JURISDICTION, MERITS, AND PROCEDURE:
THOUGHTS ON A TRICHOTOMY'
Howard M Wasserman*
In his outstanding article, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction,' Professor
Scott Dodson delineates the appropriate boundaries between rules of subject
matter jurisdiction and rules of judicial procedure in the context of removal
time limits, and argues that we must develop a "broader understanding of
the interrelationship and boundaries among the trichotomy of jurisdiction,
procedure, and merits."2 He also suggests that the strands of each pair in
the triangle interact in distinct ways and require distinct rules for separating
one from the other.' Having sought in recent work to define, clearly and
cleanly, boundaries between subject matter jurisdiction and the substantive
merits of federal claims of right,' I agree as to both points.
This Essay constitutes an initial move towards that understanding. It
examines each pair in the conceptual trichotomy, considering the connec-
tions at each point in the triangle, when those connections come into play,
and how and why to disentangle each pair.
I. JURISDICTION AND MERITS
The easiest pair to disentangle should be subject matter jurisdiction and
substantive merits of federal claims of right. Although jurisdiction has been
called a word of "many, too many, meanings, ' '5 it can broadly be defined as
the court's raw, baseline power and legitimate authority to hear and resolve
t This Essay was previously published in the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy on
February 18, 2008, as Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on
Dodson's Trichotomy, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 215 (2008), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/
lawreview/Colloquy/2008/6/.
Associate Professor, FIU College of Law.
I Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 55 (2008).
2 Id. at 89.
3 Id. at 89-90.
4 See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 KANSAS L. REV. 227
(2008) [hereinafter Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights]; Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and
Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. REV. 579 (2007) [hereinafter Wasserman, Substantiality]; Howard M. Was-
serman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643 (2005) [hereinafter Wasserman, Jurisdiction].
5 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)).
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the legal and factual issues in a class of cases.6 Merits, by contrast, are de-
fined by who can sue whom, what real-world conduct can provide basis for
a suit, and the legal consequences of a defendant's failure to conform that
conduct to its legal duties.7 The consequence of the jurisdictional label
most frequently sounds in practical effects: jurisdictional issues are not sub-
ject to waiver by parties, the court bears an independent obligation to inves-
tigate and raise jurisdictional problems, and the court resolves any factual
issues on which jurisdiction turns.8 On the other hand, merits issues should
be resolved at trial, typically with a jury serving as finder of any contested
facts.' Most dramatically, courts tend, properly or otherwise, to construe ju-
risdictional rules "rigidly, literally, and mercilessly,"'" in a way they do not
with merits rules.
My basic argument has been that there should be no overlap in the
definitions between jurisdiction and merits because statutory grants of fed-
eral jurisdiction focus on nonsubstantive questions, distinct from the source
of the right sued upon." Jurisdictional rules ordinarily inquire about either
the identity of the parties or the source of the legal right or liberty asserted; 2
neither inquiry depends on the success of the substantive claim asserted. 3
The Supreme Court recently recognized this in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
holding that an element of the plaintiffs federal claim of right does not af-
fect the court's jurisdiction; the plaintiff's success or failure in pleading and
proving an element determines only whether the plaintiff prevails on the
merits. 4 Arbaugh commands, and I have argued, that courts should con-
sider a provision of positive law as jurisdictional only when its plain lan-
guage is addressed to the court and speaks in terms of judicial power about
the class of cases that courts can hear and resolve. 5
Neither Congress nor the Court has maintained a sufficiently sharp dis-
tinction between jurisdiction and merits, and, unfortunately, Arbaugh did
not resolve the matter with finality. Most problematically, Arbaugh kept
6 Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 22 (1994);
Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1620 (2003); Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 650.
7 John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2513, 2515 (1998); Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 4, at 236.
8 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514. But see Perry Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts on Jurisdictionality, The Le-
gal Imagination, and Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164, 166 (2008),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2008/2/ ("[J]urisdictionality is more than just a
label for certain consequences.").
9 Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 663-64.
10 Dane, supra note 6, at 5.
11 See id. at 44.
12 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337, 1346 (2000).
13 Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 671-72.
14 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).
15 Id. at 526; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 693-94.
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alive the questionable doctrine of Bell v. Hood, under which a court lacks
jurisdiction where a federal claim is insubstantial or wholly frivolous. 6 I
criticize this failure elsewhere, arguing that Bell serves no purpose other
than to create confusion and uncertainty in the jurisdiction/merits comer. 7
Arbaugh also permits Congress to define jurisdiction in terms of sub-
stantive merits-so long as it is clear in doing so.'8 But the court's author-
ity to resolve legal and factual issues going to a claim of right should not
hinge on the ultimate, or even potential, success of that claim of right. Oth-
erwise, there is no rational way for Congress and the courts, in writing and
interpreting jurisdictional grants, to decide when to overlap and when not
to. If the issues can overlap, then every dismissal or rejection of a claim po-
tentially becomes a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and no claim ever can
be said to be defeated on the merits. 9 Alternatively, if only some jurisdic-
tional grants are bound up with merits, there is no explanation or justifica-
tion for why some merits issues should be jurisdictional and others not.
Courts thus continue to wrestle with statutory text and congressional
intent at the sign of any apparent jurisdiction/merits overlap. This wrestling
frequently occurs with respect to federal sovereign immunity, where Con-
gress consents to suit for certain claims under certain conditions and grants
federal jurisdiction to hear those suits.2" But if the conditions for the waiver
of sovereign immunity are not met, does the court lack jurisdiction over the
action? Or does the plaintiff's claim against the government fail on the
merits because the government is not subject to a judicially remediable sub-
stantive legal duty?
This divide formed the core of John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States.2' Under the Tucker Act, the United States can be sued for monetary
claims-sounding in the Constitution, federal law, contract, quasi-contract,
or nontort liquidated damages-with exclusive jurisdiction vested in the
United States Court of Claims.22 A separate provision imposes a six-year
statute of limitations for commencing actions in that court.23 Statutes of
limitations ordinarily are characterized as substantive; they are an affirma-
tive defense to the merits of the claim.24 But the claim of right against the
United States exists only because Congress waived sovereign immunity;
thus, the argument goes, the waiver was valid only under certain conditions,
16 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513 n.10 (citing Bell v. Hood, 376 U.S. 678 (1946)).
17 Wasserman, Substantiality, supra note 4, at 582-84.
18 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-15.
19 Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 672.
20 Dane, supra note 6, at 45 & n.128.
21 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008), affig 457 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
22 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
23 Id. § 2501.
24 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1159-60
(1982); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
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one of which was timely commencement of the action."s In short, the Court
of Claims had jurisdiction over any claims in which sovereign immunity
was waived, and sovereign immunity was waived only if the claim was
timely filed. For the Federal Circuit, this rendered the statute of limitations
jurisdictional and, for purposes of that case, not subject to waiver by the
parties.
Viewing the limitations period as jurisdictional overlooks two discrete
concerns. The first is the text of § 2501, which, properly read, addresses
the time for bringing claims and not the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.
Section 2501 speaks of "every claim of which the United States Court of
Federal Claims has jurisdiction," but that language is not addressed to the
court; rather, it is addressed to the parties contemplating such cases. Since
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims extends no further than claims for
monetary recovery against the United States, the quoted language means
"every claim against the United States"; so understood, § 2501 is more
clearly grounded in a merits determination of who can be sued for some
conduct.
Second, on close examination, sovereign immunity makes better sense
as a merits issue. By subjecting the United States to suit, Congress identi-
fies an appropriate and available defendant in an action-itself. The United
States places itself under a legal duty to adhere to substantive rules in its
contracting and business conduct and attaches a judicially enforceable legal
consequence-monetary liability-to its failure to adhere to its duties. Ab-
sent the waiver of sovereign immunity, no claim would lie against the
United States because there would be no enforceable duty on the United
States to behave in a particular way and no right to legal remedy from the
United States. This is the essence of merits analysis-who can be sued for
what conduct to recover what remedy.26
The "immunity" label and its treatment as a threshold litigation issue
do not change that character. Government-official immunities (for exam-
ple, absolute judicial immunity from constitutional claims) also are thresh-
old defenses providing protection from suit (not merely liability), but courts
nevertheless treat them as defenses to the merits. 7 Similarly, the Court of
Claims remains open and empowered to hear claims against the United
States; the different question is whether the conditions for waiver of immu-
nity can be established in a given plaintiff's case.
The actual jurisdictional grant for the Court of Claims in § 1491(a)(1)
identifies the appropriate forum for any lawsuit against the United States for
the claims identified. That provision functions as a party-based jurisdic-
25 John R. Sand, 457 F.3d at 1354-55.
26 But see United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) ("[T]he existence of consent is a pre-
requisite for jurisdiction.").
27 See, e.g., Rogers v. Montgomery, No. 4:07-1512-MBS, 2007 WL2152896, at *3 (D.S.C. July 25,
2007).
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tional grant, under which federal judicial power over an action turns on the
identity of the parties.2" Compare this with basic diversity jurisdiction, un-
der which federal district courts attain jurisdiction based on the citizenship
of the parties.29 The diversity statute disconnects jurisdiction and the sub-
stantive merits of the underlying claim. 0 Where the named defendant in a
diversity action is not the proper or appropriate party because the conditions
for its liability under substantive law have not been met, the plaintiffs case
is lost on the merits, not for want of diversity jurisdiction. Section
1491(a)(1) should be understood in the same way. When the United States
is not a proper defendant because the conditions for it to be sued and sub-
ject to liability on a contract or other monetary claim-such as the timeli-
ness of the lawsuit-have not been met, the case against the United States is
lost on the merits. The Court of Claims never loses its adjudicative juris-
diction-it simply has no valid claim to adjudicate against a potentially li-
able defendant.
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed in John R. Sand, holding that
the lower court was required to raise the limitations issue sua sponte and
that there was no waiver of the issue. Importantly, however, the Court
seemed to purposefully avoid expanding the concept of jurisdiction. The
Court never described the limitations period as jurisdictional, instead label-
ing it a "more absolute[] kind of limitations period."'" In other words,
§ 2501 retains unique rigid characteristics akin to jurisdictional rules, but is
not necessarily an actual jurisdictional rule because it is not tied to the
court's raw structural authority to hear and resolve legal and factual issues
in the case. The Court essentially disaggregated one prime consequence of
jurisdictionality-nonwaivability-from the jurisdictional label and read
§ 2501 as attaching those consequences to a nonjurisdictional, thus merits-
related, limitations period.32 Merits-based affirmative defenses ordinarily
are subject to party waiver, but that need not be so. As the master of the
scope and nature of the rights existing under federal substantive law, Con-
gress could create a uniquely absolute, mandatory statute of limitations that
nevertheless remains substantive-merits-based. It need only make clear the
mandatory nature of the particular limitations defense.
Evan Tsen Lee argues that there is no hard conceptual difference be-
tween jurisdiction and merits, and that nothing categorically separates juris-
diction questions from merits questions other than legislative say-so. Thus,
28 Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1499, 1508 (1990); Edward Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions
Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239,
2250 n.57 (1999).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
30 Lee, supra note 6, at 1626; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 701.
31 John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 754 (2008).
32 The Court actually undertook no new statutory analysis to get to this point, instead basing its de-
cision largely on statutory stare decisis. Id. at 756.
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nothing prevents the legislature from tying jurisdiction to the equities.33
But, simply because Congress can define jurisdiction in merits terms does
not mean it should. Any overlap is "awkward for legal doctrine and the le-
gal culture" and unnecessarily complicates procedural matters.34
Whether or not it is possible to create a single framework for defining
jurisdiction,35 it is possible to eliminate unnecessary overlap by consciously
avoiding it in the legislative and judicial lawmaking processes. As a practi-
cal matter, there is no reason for Congress to define jurisdiction by anything
related to the merits or equities of a case; nothing is gained by linking them
and a great deal is lost. Nor is there reason for the courts to affirmatively
interpret Congress as having linked them. Mindful legislative drafting and
similarly mindful judicial analysis should achieve the necessary clean and
clear line between this pair. John R. Sand now gives Congress a new draft-
ing option. It can make some merits rules "more absolute" without squeez-
ing those rules into the jurisdictional box. This provides the systemic
benefits of nonwaivable requirements without muddying or overexpanding
the concept of jurisdiction and without forcing courts to adopt strained
statutory readings.
II. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
Dodson's recent work analyzes two timing provisions: the time for re-
moving cases to federal court and the time for filing a notice of appeal from
the district court to the court of appeals.3" Timing rules straddle the juris-
diction/procedure line. While jurisdictional rules define whether a court
can exercise power to hear and resolve a case, procedural rules dictate how
a court will do so.37 Timing rules might fit logically in either category.
Dodson divides the concepts around three key normative concerns.
The first is whether Congress has specifically designated a rule as jurisdic-
tional, with a presumption of jurisdictionality applied when Congress
speaks in jurisdictional terms about the class of cases a court can hear.38
The second looks to the function of a provision and whether it determines
the power of the courts or whether it controls the behavior of the parties in
litigation.39 This considers to whom a rule is directed: jurisdictional rules
are directed at the court and its power, while procedural rules are directed to
33 Lee, supra note 6, at 1614, 1627, 1629.
34 Dane, supra note 6, at 47; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 662.
35 Compare Dodson, supra note 1, at 66, with Lee, supra note 6, at 1629.
36 Dodson, supra note 1, at 56, 58; Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 48 (2007), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/21/
[hereinafter Dodson, Jurisdictionality].
37 Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2364 (2007); Dodson, supra note 1, at 59-60, 71; Dodson,
Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 44.
38 Dodson, supra note 1, at 66; Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 43.
39 Dodson, supra note 1, at 71.
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the parties and their rights and obligations within litigation. ° Procedural
rules go to the "fairness and efficiency of the truth-finding process," ulti-
mately serving systemic values such as litigant autonomy, judicial effi-
ciency, and cost-effectiveness. 4' The third concern looks to the effects and
implications of characterizing a rule as one or the other.42 Dodson's frame-
work is sound and consistent with my suggestions for the jurisdiction/merits
pairing, particularly in its focus on the language of the applicable legal rule
and whether it speaks to the court about its structural power or to the parties
about how to behave within the litigation process.
Unfortunately, the Court last term in Bowles v. Russell ignored Dod-
son's framework-as well as any other meaningful framework. Instead, it
simply declared that the time requirement for filing a notice of appeal was
jurisdictional and not subject to any exception, even when the reason for the
untimely filing was a party's reliance on a judicial order that incorrectly
stated the time for filing the appeal.43 The Court's only explanation was
that the timing requirement appeared in a statute that was enacted by both
houses of Congress and signed by the President, rather than in a court-
promulgated rule.44 Dodson accurately criticizes Bowles, taking the major-
ity to task for failing to adopt any coherent guidelines beyond the distinc-
tion between statutory or rule sources." This is a meaningless justification
because there is nothing inherently jurisdictional about a statute, particu-
larly one that that neither speaks to the court nor mentions jurisdiction.
Dodson is correct that the demarcation between jurisdiction and proce-
dure may be less urgent than between jurisdiction and merits, because the
timing and manner of adjudicating issues does not diverge with this pair as
it does with jurisdiction and merits. Jurisdiction is one of several proce-
dural preliminaries that courts consider mainly at the outset of litigation,
with the court acting as finder of fact for all of them.46 The only difference
between them lies in the unique elements of jurisdiction-nonwaivability
and the independent judicial obligation to investigate.47 Jurisdictional rules
also are generally understood to admit no equitable leniency or flexibility,
an understanding Professor Dane labels an unfortunate mistake.48
But, just as the John R. Sand Court read a merits rule to possess juris-
dictional characteristics,49 Congress similarly could define a procedural rule
40 Id.
41 John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693, 725 (1974); Dodson, supra
note 1, at 71; Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46.
42 Dodson, supra note 1, at 77.
43 Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365 (2007).
44 Id. at 2364-66; see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000); FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).
45 Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 45.
46 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 69-70; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 649-50.
47 Dodson, supra note 1, at 60.
48 Dane, supra note 8, at 167-68.
49 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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to possess some or all jurisdictional characteristics and consequences. Dod-
son argues that the outcome in Bowles-that the time for filing an appeal is
not subject to equitable exception and thus that appeal was untimely-was
correct." The timing rule could be understood as "mandatory but nonjuris-
dictional"; the rule governs the parties' conduct in court and does not go to
the basic structural values that define jurisdiction, but the court possesses
no discretion to deviate from the rule on equitable grounds." As the Court
did in John R. Sand, Dodson disaggregates the consequences of jurisdiction
from the core definition of the term. This produces the expected benefits
from the rigidity that accompanies jurisdictionality, when intended by the
rulemaker, "without doing violence to the nature of jurisdiction."5 In fact,
the discussion of Bowles in John R. Sand suggests that the Court has retro-
actively recast the earlier decision to make the appeals-timing rule absolute
for purposes of efficiency, but not necessarily jurisdictional. 3
Note that the middle road proposed by Dodson and implicitly approved
of in John R. Sand may serve to further cloud the line between jurisdiction
and procedure. If Congress can assign a jurisdictional characteristic to a
procedural rule, any practical distinctions between jurisdictional rules and
procedural rules seems lost. Nothing else defines the practical divide be-
tween these two strands, since the court serves as factfinder for both issues.
Characterizing a rule in this pair as one or the other thus must focus on the
policies and values underlying the rule-structural values that define juris-
dictional rules as opposed to litigant- and efficiency-based values that de-
fine procedural rules. 4 It also forces courts to find the formalist core of
what it means for a rule to be "jurisdictional," something the courts hereto-
fore have been reluctant to attempt. 55
Procedure and jurisdiction do align and divide over the question of
congressional power over each. On one hand, the extent of congressional
control over federal court jurisdiction has been an ongoing topic of textual,
theoretical, and policy debate and dispute, 6 with a number of commentators
arguing that the text of Article III limits Congress's ability to cut into the
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. 7 On the other hand, there generally has
been far hess debate over congressional power over judicial procedure;
50 Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46.
51 Id. at 46-47. But see Dane, supra note 8, at 164 ("[T]ime limits can also be jurisdictional without
being interpreted literally and peremptorily ....").
52 Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46.
53 Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure Prof. Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/
2008/0l/dodson-three-mu.html (Jan. 8, 2008).
54 Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46-47.
55 Dane, supra note 8, at 175 (criticizing courts' failure to "draw connections and to investigate the
roots of legal ideas"); Dane, supra note 6, at 135.
56 Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 4, at 227-29, 269-71.
57 Amar, supra note 28, at 1507-08; James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority,
and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 191, 237-38 (2007).
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courts and commentators long have accepted that Congress can dictate fed-
eral procedure through prospective rules, whether by delegating that control
to the Judiciary, as under the Rules Enabling Act, or by making procedural
rules itself." Thus, faced with a congressionally enacted rule that somehow
limits judicial power, its definition as jurisdictional or procedural may be
essential to understanding the rule's validity.
III. PROCEDURE AND MERITS
This pair has the longest history together. The distinction between
procedure and substance is famously at the federalist heart of the modem
Erie-Hanna doctrine, dictating the choice between federal and state law in
diversity cases in federal court.59 Procedure focuses on rules going to the
fairness and efficiency of the truth-finding process and substance goes to
everything else.6" Courts apply a functional approach, looking to whether
the policy underlying the rule "pertains to the operation of the federal
courts" and is integrated into a system generally applicable to all civil ac-
tions and designed to achieve just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution.6'
The split is tenuous, given that procedural rules necessarily affect sub-
stantive results.62 But overlapping effects are not a problem; after all, the
goal of modem federal procedure is to enable resolution of cases on their
merits.63 The point is defining and understanding the two concepts, and
here the Court arguably has drawn a "serviceable line between state 'sub-
stantive' law that binds federal courts and 'procedural' law governed by
federal rules. '
The procedure/merits line also rides on strong separation of powers
concerns, dividing the respective lawmaking capacities of Congress and the
courts. The Rules Enabling Act delegates to the Supreme Court, and in turn
to a standing advisory committee, power to make general rules of proce-
58 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and
Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1681-82 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank,
Procedure]; Burbank, supra note 24, at 1115-16. But see Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation
in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 382 (1992).
59 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad
for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in
its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 966 (1998).
60 Ely, supra note 41, at 725.
61 Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE L.J.
281,308.
62 Burbank, Procedure, supra note 58, at 1710; Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legis-
lative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory
of United States v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 460 (2006).
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 1; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986).
64 Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 21),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1009992.
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dure.65 It further prohibits the Court from making any rules that "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right."66 Stephen Burbank grounds the
latter limitation on allocation of federal rulemaking powers between Con-
gress and the Court, with Congress delegating only control over procedural
rules, while retaining power to make substantive rules.67 Congress reserves
to itself the power to make rules governing real-world, primary conduct and
defining rights, duties, and obligations beyond the four walls of the court-
house, while the Supreme Court under the REA is limited only to making
rules governing conduct within the four walls of the courthouse.6"
One example of the legislative/judicial divide and the problem of sepa-
ration of powers is the extent to which Congress can limit judicial enforce-
ment and remediation of federal constitutional rights. Central to that debate
is whether remedies properly are viewed as substantive, and thus tied to the
merits, or as procedural. No one doubts congressional power to define
remedies where it creates the underlying substantive right.69 And the con-
sensus is that Congress retains power to establish procedural rules through
its ordinary legislative powers.7" But Congress cannot define the meaning
of an underlying substantive constitutional right.7" Thus, the propriety of
legislative limitations on judicial constitutional remedies depends on how
we characterize remedies.
On one end, John Harrison espouses the traditional view of remedies as
procedural, subject to fairly plenary control through Congress's structural
legislative powers.72 Harrison argues that Congress takes the substantive
legal rules, such as the meaning of constitutional provisions and rights, as
given, then wields its structural authority to choose the means to implement
and enforce those rights.73 Daryl Levinson labels this traditional view
"rights essentialism." The constitutional right exists as the ideal, as an ul-
timate value judgment about what the Constitution means and what it pro-
tects; remedies-the rules for implementing constitutional rights and
protecting against their future violation-exist in the realm of the concrete.
The sharp distinction between rights and remedies produces a "division of
institutional labor between courts and Congress," under which courts are
uniquely well-qualified to deal with idealized and abstract constitutional
judgments about principles and values. But courts should defer to Con-
gress's close legislative control over the process of applying those constitu-
65 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a), 2073 (2000).
66 Id. § 2072(b).
67 Burbank, supra note 24, at 1113.
68 Id. at 1113-14.
69 Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673,
696 (2001).
70 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
71 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
72 Harrison, supra note 7, at 2514.
73 Id. at 2514-15.
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tional values and principles to the real world by defining expansive or nar-
row remedies.74
On the other end is Tracy Thomas's theory of the unified right, under
which the remedy is "the intrinsic, operative component activating the de-
scriptive component of all unified substantive rights. '75 A unified right has
both a descriptive component that sets forth a legal guarantee, duty, or
moral assertion grounded in the Constitution, and a remedial component
that imposes an active requirement as a consequence of a violation of the
descriptive duty. Rights and remedies are inseparable, the former meaning-
less without the latter. The remedial power is derivative of the substantive
power over the definitional right; the institutional actor that defines the core
right has the power to dictate remedies for that right.76 Because Congress
does not and cannot define the meaning of the descriptive constitutional
right, it does not have the power to dictate corresponding constitutional
remedies.77 Only the courts possess this power, as an aspect of defining the
descriptive constitutional right.
The procedure/merits corner also reveals that the long-standing aca-
demic obsession with "jurisdiction stripping" misses the larger point. Re-
medial limitations, understood as procedural rules distinct from and
collateral to substantive rights, arguably pose a greater threat to the ability
of federal courts to vindicate substantive rights than do straight-forward
strips of subject-matter jurisdiction.8
But questions remain as to the degree to which Congress might engage
in "procedure stripping"-using procedural rules and schemes to limit the
most vigorous judicial enforcement of substantive rights. For example,
Congress often creates and entwines merits and procedure in a single statu-
tory scheme. Consider the prohibitions on employment discrimination in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Congress established real-world
rights to be free from adverse employment action based on certain imper-
missible motivations (such as an employee's race or sex) and imposed on
employers a duty to refrain from discriminatory activities against employ-
ees. Congress also tied these rights to a specific and detailed remedial pro-
cedural scheme requiring: prompt initial submission, in a narrow time
frame, of claims to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for
conciliation and non-adversarial resolution; exhaustion of non-litigation ef-
74 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 86 1,
865-66 (1999).
75 Thomas, supra note 69, at 694.
76 Id. at 689, 696, 701-02.
77 Id. at 704.
78 Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of "Congress " to Attack the "Jurisdiction " of
"Federal Courts, '" 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1407-08 (2000).
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forts; and prompt internal reporting of claims prior to any official complaint
and efforts at internal employer dispute resolution.79
The result, according to Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman, is that
Title VII often does not function as a meaningful "rights-claiming system"
because compliance with the extensive right-specific procedural require-
ments effectively makes it difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to vindicate
those rights."0 Scott Moss implicates the Court in this problem, arguing that
it has acted to further two irreconcilable procedural policies-first, that
plaintiffs should wait to initiate litigation in favor of internal, informal, non-
adversary, administrative resolution, and second, that plaintiffs should file
their federal lawsuits immediately-rendering Title VII incoherent and im-
possible to navigate."' It is the relatively rare plaintiff who can steer and
clear these conflicting hurdles to gain meaningful access to the promised
substantive rights. The result is that the substantive protections purported
to derive from the statute remain largely elusive and illusory.
Martin Redish proposes one potential limit on congressional procedure
stripping grounded in constitutional democratic theory. In the name of de-
mocratic accountability, he argues, a legislature cannot deceive the public
about the state of its substantive primary rights, liberties, and duties by ma-
nipulating the attendant procedures.82 Accountability concerns prevent
Congress from defining a general rule of real-world behavior-which the
public believes entitles it to engage in some conduct or to be free from
some conduct by others (such as discrimination in employment because of
race or sex)-while simultaneously imposing procedural hurdles that pre-
vent courts from appropriately applying that rule, effectively transforming
the nature of the substantive right.8 3 To do so is to engage in a "political
shell game," achieving substantive policy outcomes by hiding the true state
of that policy from the public. 4 This, in turn, undermines the public's abil-
ity to judge representatives' performance by their votes on normative social
policy choices. 5
Redish's argument suggests some undefined limits on Congress's abil-
ity to bury substantive rights within non-navigable procedural layers-at
least without making it clear that it is doing so and that it intends to do so.
79 42 U.S.C. 2000e(e)(5) (2000); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2170-
71 (2007); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1982); Deborah L. Brake & Jo-
anna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 864, 884
(2008).
80 Brake & Grossman, supra note 79, at 861, 887.
81 Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme
Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 984 (2007).
82 Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives,
46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 715-16 (1995).
83 Redish & Pudelski, supra note 62, at 460; Redish, supra note 82, at 715.
84 Redish & Pudelski, supra note 62, at 450, 460.
85 Id. at 459; Redish, supra note 82, at 715-16.
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If Grossman and Brake are correct that Title VII has failed as a source of
substantive rights because those rights have been overwhelmed by its pro-
cedural scheme, perhaps Title VII becomes an example of the very political
shell game that Redish condemns.
CONCLUSION
Scott Dodson invited a conversation about the trichotomy of merits, ju-
risdiction, and procedure, and I hope this Essay serves as a workable open-
ing statement. Whether we can formally disentangle the three concepts or
each of the three pairs perhaps is a matter of dispute. But by thinking in
terms of the overlap and the interactions among them, perhaps we can re-
member how important it is to keep them separate from one another in the
course of creating and applying legal rules. And perhaps in time we might
find a middle ground among the strands, in which they might share charac-
teristics and consequences while retaining distinct conceptual identities and
definitions.
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